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Save Now, Pay Later: The Unfortunate Reality of 
PLIVA v. Mensing 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 and 2002, Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy were 
prescribed Reglan,1 a drug often utilized for treating acid reflux.2 
Their pharmacists gave them generic metoclopramide, which they 
took, as prescribed, for several years.3 Both women developed 
tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder characterized by 
involuntary movements of the face, torso, and extremities.4 Demahy 
experienced violent shaking, blinked excessively, and often 
struggled to speak and write.5 The disorder was so damaging that 
Demahy was forced to stay at home due to her inability to work 
effectively or drive safely.6 Mensing’s situation was not any better. 
Extremely limited in control of her movement, Gladys Mensing was 
forced to rely on her granddaughter to help her bathe.7 Also plagued 
with an inability to control the movement of her tongue and facial 
muscles,8 Gladys struggled to be understood by others.9 
In separate lawsuits, both Mensing and Demahy alleged that the 
generic drug manufacturers of metoclopramide were liable under 
state tort law for failure to provide adequate warning labels.10 At the 
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Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, 
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between long-term ingestion of [metoclopramide] and movement disorders.” 
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (D. Minn. 2008), rev’d, 588 
F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 
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district court level, Mensing’s failure-to-warn claims were held to 
conflict with and to be preempted by federal law.11 The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) did not preempt Mensing’s failure-to-warn 
claims against the generic manufacturers.12 Demahy’s failure-to-
warn claims were not held at either the district court level or at the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to be preempted.13 Mensing’s and 
Demahy’s cases were eventually consolidated and brought before 
the Supreme Court, which rejected the failure-to-warn claims that 
each plaintiff asserted due to preemption by federal law.14  
The Court stated that even assuming that the failure-to-warn 
allegations were valid, the claims were preempted due to the 
impossibility of the manufacturers being able to comply with both 
federal and state drug law.15 Specifically, the Court relied on the 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) belief that the generic drug 
manufacturers, unlike their brand-name counterparts, could not 
unilaterally have utilized the Changes-Being-Effected (CBE) 
process that allows a drug manufacturer to enhance a warning label 
without prior FDA approval.16 The PLIVA decision came just two 
years after the Court reached the opposite conclusion regarding 
brand name drugs in Wyeth v. Levine.17 In Wyeth, the Supreme 
Court held that failure-to-warn claims against brand-name drug 
manufacturers were not preempted by federal law. Noting the 
“unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation ha[d] dealt”18 
Mensing and Demahy, the PLIVA Court admitted that  
finding pre-emption here but not in Wyeth makes little sense. 
Had Mensing and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name 
drug prescribed by their doctors, Wyeth would control and 
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their lawsuits would not be pre-empted. But because 
pharmacists, acting in full accord with state law, substituted 
generic metoclopramide instead, federal law pre-empts these 
lawsuits.19 
In PLIVA, the majority attempted to escape accountability for 
such an unjust result by pointing out that its duties did not extend to 
determining whether a statutory scheme was “unusual or even 
bizarre.”20 With this statement, the majority pretended that drug 
labeling laws were undeniably clear and consequently not open to 
multiple interpretations. Rather than take an in-depth look into the 
purpose of the FDA and the regulations at issue, the majority instead 
sought to shift the burden to Congress and the FDA, noting that they 
possess the ability to change the law and regulations, respectively.21 
The Supreme Court’s decision in PLIVA, which held that state 
failure-to-warn claims are preempted by federal law, is problematic 
because it applies a lower standard for “impossibility preemption” 
than required by precedent.22 In Wyeth, the Court emphasized that a 
defense of impossibility preemption is held to a demanding standard. 
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ various arguments, the PLIVA Court was 
too shortsighted in its application of the relevant FDA regulations. 
The future effect of the PLIVA Court’s decision will likely be 
twofold: (1) Consumers of generic drugs will be without proper 
remedies in failure-to-warn suits, and (2) Brand-name drug 
manufacturers will be forced to shoulder the responsibility of generic 
drug manufacturers. To properly fix the current situation, the FDA 
must either modify the CBE rules or create a separate, yet similar 
avenue allowing generic drug manufacturers to “unilaterally” modify 
their drugs’ labels. 
This Comment discusses the PLIVA Court’s problematic analysis 
in reaching its decision, the harms that this decision creates, and 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. (citations omitted). 
 20. Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 
2710, 2733 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added). Wyeth sets out various 
impossibility preemption examples, none to which the current standard would 
apply. PLIVA regards neither a situation in which “‘state law penalizes what 
federal law requires,’” id. at 589 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 873 (2000)), nor a case in which state law claims “‘directly conflict’ 
with federal law,” id. (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 
U.S. 214, 227 (1998)), nor a case “‘where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility,’” id. at 589–90 (quoting Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)). As stated in Wyeth, 
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Id. at 590. 




lastly, the options available to correct the current situation. Part I 
provides the necessary background, first touching upon the FDA 
with a focus on the drug approval process. Subsections of Part I 
present relevant information on federal drug labeling regulations, 
state duties regarding drug labeling, and pertinent information on 
federal preemption of state laws. Part II presents and then critiques 
the Court’s analysis in PLIVA. It then compares the PLIVA analysis 
with the Court’s analysis in Wyeth, showing why the two decisions 
are incompatible. Part III discusses the effect this decision is likely 
to have on consumers and drug manufacturers. Finally, Part IV 
suggests possibilities for fixing the drug labeling problems that the 
PLIVA decision has created. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The FDA and the Drug Approval Process 
A brief exploration of the FDA, as well as the drug approval 
process, helps explain why PLIVA is so problematic. The FDCA 
was passed in 1938 as part of a transformative renovation of the 
public health system.23 The FDCA authorized the FDA to require 
evidence of the safety of new drugs from their manufacturers.24 The 
FDCA’s scope has since been expanded through statutory 
amendments, which has led to increased FDA power regarding 
regulation of pharmaceutical drugs.25  
There are two sets of regulations concerning the drug approval 
process: one for brand-name drugs, which are the first to enter the 
market, and one for generic drugs, which apply after patent protection 
for the brand-name drugs has expired.26 According to the FDA, a 
generic drug is defined as a drug that is equivalent in both quality and 
performance to a brand-name drug.27 
Among its duties relating to the purpose of promoting public 
health, the FDA is required to ensure that all drugs for human 
consumption are safe and effective.28 To accomplish this goal, the 
FDCA mandates that no drug be introduced into interstate commerce 
                                                                                                             
 23. Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Regulatory 
Information/Legislation/default.htm (last updated July 9, 2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Lesley A. Stout, Making Changes: Generic Drug Labeling and the Case 
Against Federal Preemption, 98 KY. L.J. 623, 628 (2010). 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); id. § 355(j). 
 27. FAQs About CDER, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www 
.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/
FAQsaboutCDER/ (last updated Oct. 20, 2010). 
 28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 




without prior approval.29 There are two different standards for 
approval depending on whether the drug is “new” (brand name) or 
“generic.”30 
1. Brand-Name Drug Approval 
To introduce a new drug into the market, a drug manufacturer 
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) for approval.31 The 
NDA ensures that the FDA has enough information to determine 
whether the drug is safe and effective, whether its benefits outweigh 
its risks, whether the proposed labeling is appropriate, and what the 
labeling should contain.32 In order to have the necessary information 
to make these determinations, the NDA requires full reports of 
investigations relating to the drug’s safety and effectiveness, as well 
as the drug’s proposed labeling.33 
2. Generic Drug Approval and Hatch–Waxman 
Prior to 1984, generic and brand-name drugs had to abide by the 
same rules.34 Generic drugs sought to be introduced into the market 
were required to go through the same NDA process as their brand-
name counterparts.35 Such a system kept generic drug costs high, not 
allowing consumers to benefit from the lower costs of generics as 
they do today. In an effort to “make available more low cost generic 
drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure,”36 Congress 
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. § 355(a). 
 30. Compare id. § 355(b) (dealing with approval of applications for new 
(brand name) drugs), with id. § 355(j) (2004) (dealing with approval of 
applications for generic drugs). 
 31. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http: 
//www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand
Approved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last 
updated Aug. 20, 2010). 
 32. Id. The NDA’s goals also allow for a determination of whether the drug’s 
“identity, strength, quality, and purity” will be adequately preserved, but that goal 
is not relevant to the issue at hand. Id. 
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). Although the NDA requires more information, such 
as a statement regarding the drug’s composition, for the purposes of discussing 
failure-to-warn claims, the rest of the requirements are beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  
 34. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing¸131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011).  
 35. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 98–857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2647. 




of 1984,37 commonly referred to as the Hatch–Waxman 
Amendments.38  
With the passing of these amendments, generic drugs no longer 
needed to submit their own NDA. Instead, to gain FDA approval, 
generic drugs need only prove that they are essentially the same in 
all respects as an already approved drug.39 They do this by 
submitting an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).40 In an 
ANDA, a generic drug manufacturer must supply information to the 
FDA that proves, among other things, that their drug (1) has the 
same active ingredient(s) as the approved brand-name drug; (2) has 
the same route of administration, dosage form, and strength as the 
approved brand-name drug; and (3) is the bioequivalent to the 
approved brand-name drug.41 In addition to demonstrating that the 
nature of each drug is essentially identical, the generic drug 
manufacturer must show that the labeling proposed for its drug is 
the same as that of the previously approved brand-name drug.42  
The Hatch–Waxman Amendments have been instrumental in the 
creation of low-cost generic drugs. Because generics no longer need 
to independently prove their own safety and efficacy, generic 
manufacturers are able to introduce their drugs into the market at a 
much lower cost than that of the brand-name manufacturers.43 The 
costs of bringing a generic drug into the market are estimated to be 
only 1 to 2 million dollars, a massive drop from the billion or more 
dollars required for a brand-name drug.44 With the ability to bring 
drugs into the market at lower costs, generic drugs can be sold at a 
lower cost. This ultimately benefits the consumer. In fact, in 2009, 
                                                                                                             
 37. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).  
 38. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. The amendments are commonly called the 
Hatch–Waxman Amendments because Senator Hatch and Congressman Waxman 
sponsored the amendments. 
 39. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 41. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006). Bioequivalent drug products are pharmaceutical 
equivalents. They are deemed to be interchangeable with the brand-name drug 
because they are regarded as therapeutically equivalent. Orange Book Preface, 
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 43. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 44. OFFICE OF SCI. & DATA POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 5 (2010), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf. 




the average retail prescription price for a generic drug was 76% less 
than that of its brand-name counterpart.45 
3. State Laws Regarding Substitution 
Congress was not alone in its desire to expand the use of generic 
drugs.46 Over the years leading up to the Hatch–Waxman 
Amendments, states enacted legislation allowing pharmacists to 
substitute generic drugs for brand-name drugs when filling a 
prescription.47 While the FDA regulates overall labeling standards, 
the laws regulating the practice of pharmacy exist at the state level.48 
These laws vary from state to state.49 Regardless of the variation 
among their laws, at a minimum, each state allows some type of 
generic substitution.50 In every state, however, substitution can only 
occur when the physician has not indicated that the brand-name drug 
must be given.51 When such notice has not been provided, some 
states require substitution of the generic drug for the brand-name 
drug.52 Other states allow it but do not mandate it.53 Additionally, 
some states require that for substitution to occur, the pharmacist 
must obtain the patient’s consent.54 In Louisiana, where Demahy 
brought suit, the pharmacist is allowed, but not required, to 
substitute as long as the physician does not mandate using the 
brand-name drug.55 In Minnesota, where Mensing’s failure-to-warn 
claims were first heard, the pharmacist is required to substitute as 
long as the physician does not prescribe the brand-name drug and 
include the words dispense as written or letters DAW on the 
prescription.56 
The impact on generic drugs from the Hatch–Waxman 
Amendments as well as state substitution laws has been astonishing. 
In 1984, the first year after the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman 
Amendments, only 19% of those drugs sold in the United States 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. 
 46. It is also worthwhile to note that encouragement of generic drug 
substitution does not stop with the FDA or states; even many insurance companies 
structure their plans in such a way as to promote generics. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 
2584 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 2583. 
 48. OFFICE OF SCI. & DATA POLICY, supra note 44, at 7. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 14–19. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 15.  
 56. Id. at 16. 




were generic.57 In contrast, in 2009, generic drugs constituted 75% of 
all prescription drugs distributed.58 Currently, 90% of prescriptions 
that have a generic version available are filled with the generic.59 
Before brand-name drugs, and consequently their generic and less 
expensive counterparts, can enter the market, the FDA must approve 
them. 
B. Federal Drug Labeling Requirements 
Federal preemption of failure-to-warn claims depends on 
whether generic drug manufacturers can unilaterally change their 
labels. To properly compare the decisions of Wyeth and PLIVA, a 
background of labeling requirements, both in general, as well as 
those specific to generic manufacturers, is necessary.  
For FDA approval, a NDA must include the proposed labeling 
of the drug.60 The purpose of labeling is to provide information that 
will allow for the safe and effective use of the drug.61 A drug 
manufacturer’s labeling duties do not stop after initial approval, 
however. In fact, the FDA can rescind approval of a drug found to 
be mislabeled.62 A drug is misbranded if its label is false or 
misleading or if it lacks “adequate warnings against . . . unsafe 
dosage or methods or duration of administration or application, in 
such manner and form, as are necessary for the protection of 
users.”63 To avoid rescission for misbranding, regulations establish 
that “labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there 
is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a 
drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved.”64  
These labeling requirements are not exclusive to brand-name 
drugs. According to the FDA, these same regulations apply to 
generic drugs.65 Throughout the amendments to the FDCA and FDA 
regulations, it has always “remained a central premise of federal 
drug regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the 
content of its label at all times.”66 This duty includes not only 
                                                                                                             
 57. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing¸131 S. Ct. 2567, 2584 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (2006). 
 61. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. V 2011). 
 63. Id. § 352(a), (f) (2006). 
 64. 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2012) 
 65. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing¸131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011). 
 66. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570–71 (2009). 




creating an adequate label but also making sure that its drugs’ 
warnings are adequate for the entire time that the drug is on the 
market.67 While a potential contradiction may exist between the duty 
to have adequate labeling at all times and the generic’s duty to have 
identical labeling to the brand-name drug, the FDA resolves this 
conflict by stating that generic drug manufacturers must ask the 
agency to strengthen the label applying to both the generic and the 
brand-name equivalent as soon as they become aware of safety 
problems.68 
1. The Changes-Being-Effected Process 
The CBE process is one method available for brand-name drug 
manufacturers to make label changes. The CBE process has its 
origins in a 1965 FDA policy attempting to allow certain changes in 
the labeling and manufacturing of drugs to be implemented as soon 
as possible.69 To accomplish this, the agency decided it would not 
take action against particular changes implemented prior to FDA 
approval.70 The CBE process allows manufacturers “[t]o add or 
strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse 
reaction” or “[t]o add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and 
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product”71 without first waiting for FDA approval.72 According to 
the FDA, however, any change should be regarded as temporary73 
because the ultimate authority over drug labeling “continues to rest 
with FDA.”74 With respect to generic drug manufacturers, the FDA 
interprets the CBE process to allow generic drug manufacturers to 
change their labels only when their brand-name counterpart has 
already done so.75  
2. Generic Drug Labeling Changes 
Even though generic drug manufacturers possess the same 
ultimate responsibility as brand-name drug manufacturers to ensure 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 571. 
 68. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576. 
 69. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 (Jan. 16, 2008).  
 70. Id. 
 71. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2012). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2850 (Jan. 16, 2008).  
 74. Id. at 2849. 
 75. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing¸131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011). 




the adequacy of their labels,76 they must initially rely upon the 
brand-name manufacturer’s labeling. To get FDA approval, a 
generic drug manufacturer must submit its ANDA with information 
showing that the proposed labeling of the new drug is identical to 
that of an already approved brand-name drug.77 Although the 
generic manufacturer merely copies an already existing label, 78 it is 
not powerless regarding label content. According to the FDA, if, 
during the application phase, an ANDA applicant believes that 
certain safety information should be added to a drug’s label, then it 
should contact the FDA.79 The FDA will then decide whether to 
revise the labeling for both the generic and the brand-name drug.80 
The FDA should also be contacted if, after approval, the ANDA 
holder believes that the labels are inadequate regarding safety. 81 In 
either case, the FDA determines whether the labels of both the 
generic drug and the brand-name drug should be changed.82 
C. State Duties 
Products liability developed to increase consumer protection 
from dangerous products.83 State tort law mandates that all drug 
manufacturers ensure that their products have safe and adequate 
labeling.84 In PLIVA, the state laws applied were from Minnesota 
and Louisiana.85 Tort law from Minnesota and Louisiana requires 
drug manufacturers who know or should know of their product’s 
danger to label their products in a manner that renders them 
reasonably safe.86 Under Minnesota law, when a manufacturer “of a 
product has actual or constructive knowledge of danger to users, the 
. . . manufacturer has a duty to give warning of such dangers.”87 In 
Louisiana, the law states that “a manufacturer’s duty to warn 
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. at 2576.  
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2006). Although there are some exceptions 
to this rule, they are not the norm, they do not apply in the instant case, and they 
are not within the scope of this Comment.  
 78. Id. § 355(b)(1), (j)(2)(A)(v). 
 79. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 
17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 
(1986). 
 84. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. 
 85. Id. at 2573. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 
N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977)). 




includes a duty to provide adequate instructions for safe use of a 
product.”88 Thus, state tort law requires that labels contain adequate 
warnings regarding their products’ danger. The failure to do so 
allows an injured consumer to bring a failure-to-warn claim.89 
However, if preempted by federal law, then failure-to-warn claims 
cannot provide a remedy for injured consumers.  
D. Preemption 
The basis of federal preemption is the Supremacy Clause which 
states:  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.90 
Although powerful, the framers did not intend for this clause to 
grant the federal government unlimited power.91 Federal law has 
been found to preempt state law in three ways: (1) express 
preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) conflict preemption.92 
Express preemption exists where Congress has provided “explicit 
preemptive language.”93 Field preemption occurs “where the 
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it.”94 Lastly, conflict preemption occurs in two instances: “where 
‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
                                                                                                             
 88. Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 89. See Hannah B. Murray, Note, Generic Preemption: Applying Conflict 
Preemption After Wyeth v. Levine, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 255, 
258 (2009). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 91. See Joseph F. Petros III, The Other War On Drugs: Federal Preemption, 
The FDA, and Prescription Drugs After Wyeth v. Levine, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 637, 644 (2011). 
 92. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
 93. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). 
 94. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 




accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”’95 
Physical impossibility preemption was at issue in PLIVA. Physical 
impossibility preemption does not require that the laws at issue 
conflict in all aspects.96 As with all preemption cases, analysis should 
be guided by two jurisprudential cornerstones.97 First, the intent of 
Congress is the most important factor in every preemption case.98 
Second, when dealing with preemption in a field that states have 
traditionally occupied, there is a presumption against preemption.99 In 
PLIVA, however, the majority considered no such presumption. 
II. PLIVA V. MENSING 
In PLIVA v. Mensing, the two plaintiffs, Gladys Mensing and 
Julie Demahy, alleged that their long-term use of metoclopramide 
caused them to develop tardive dyskinesia and that the manufacturers 
were therefore liable under state laws for failure to provide adequate 
warning labels.100 The plaintiffs “claimed that ‘despite mounting 
evidence that long term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive 
dyskinesia far greater than that indicated on the label,’ none of the 
Manufacturers had changed their labels to adequately warn of that 
danger.”101 The manufacturers countered the plaintiffs’ allegations by 
stating that federal law preempted such state law claims.102 
Specifically, the manufacturers alleged preemption due to 
impossibility.103 They stated that due to the federal statutes and FDA 
regulations requiring generic drugs to have the same safety and 
efficacy labels as their brand-name counterparts, it would have been 
impossible to follow a state law that required a different label.104 The 
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Court agreed, holding that the failure-to-warn claims were preempted 
by federal law.105  
A. The Majority’s Analysis 
The Court stated that if the plaintiffs’ allegations were true, then 
the manufacturers were required under state law to use a different, 
safer label.106 The Court outlined the relevant federal and state 
requirements concerning drug labeling requirements.107 According 
to the majority, the relevant inquiry was “whether, and to what 
extent, generic manufacturers may change their labels after initial 
FDA approval.”108  
While Mensing and Demahy claimed that there were several 
ways in which the manufacturers could have altered their warning 
labels, the Court disagreed, relying on the FDA’s interpretation of 
its own regulations as evidence to the contrary.109 According to the 
FDA, generic drug manufacturers must always use the same 
warning labels as their brand-name counterparts.110  
The plaintiffs first argued that the manufacturers could have 
changed their warning labels with the CBE process.111 The Court 
rejected such a notion, again deferring to the FDA’s opposing 
viewpoint.112 The Court presented the FDA’s interpretation of the 
CBE regulation, which allows changes on generic labels only when 
its brand-name counterpart has already made a change, unless the 
FDA indicates otherwise.113 Unilaterally changing the generic 
drug’s warning label, according to the FDA, would violate the 
statutes and regulations that require the generic’s label to match that 
of its brand-name counterpart.114 The Court deferred to the FDA’s 
interpretation because the agency’s interpretation was not found to 
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be “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”115 The 
Court added that neither of the plaintiffs provided any reason why 
the agency’s interpretation should be doubted.116 Adopting the FDA 
interpretation, the Court essentially dismissed the CBE process as an 
available option for the generic manufacturers to make the state-
required changes.117 
The plaintiffs then argued that the manufacturers could have 
provided so-called Dear Doctor letters “to send additional warnings 
to prescribing physicians and other healthcare professionals.”118 
Such letters can be sent by manufacturers and are used to relay 
important information about their drugs, including significant health 
hazards and important labeling changes.119 Addressing the Dear 
Doctor argument, the Court once again deferred to the FDA’s 
interpretation.120 The FDA stated that Dear Doctor letters qualify as 
labeling.121 As such, they pose two particular problems: First, a Dear 
Doctor letter with “substantial new warning information would not 
be consistent with the drug’s approved labeling,” and second, the 
sending of Dear Doctor letters by a generic manufacturer but not its 
brand-name counterpart would suggest a therapeutic difference 
between the two drugs and therefore could be misleading.122 Thus, 
the Court determined that Dear Doctor letters were not available as 
an option for the generic manufacturers to provide the additional 
warnings required by state law.123 
Although the FDA dismissed the CBE process and Dear Doctor 
letters as possible methods by which the generic drug manufacturers 
could change their warning labels, it did believe that the 
manufacturers possessed an option for updating their labels. The 
FDA stated that manufacturers not only could have but were 
required to have proposed stronger warning labels to the FDA if 
they believed that such labels were necessary.124 The FDA based 
this duty on its interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2), which 
provides that a drug is misbranded unless its labeling has 
sufficiently adequate warnings that protect its users.125 The FDA’s 
interpretation of this statute states that a drug’s labeling should be 
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revised “as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of 
a serious hazard with a drug.”126 The FDA reconciled the 
manufacturer’s duty to maintain adequate labels and its duty of 
maintaining an identical label to that of its brand-name counterpart by 
stating that generic drugs, in instances requiring an updated label, are 
required to ask the FDA to strengthen the label for both it and its 
brand-name counterpart.127  
While the defendants disagreed with the FDA’s determination 
that such a duty existed, the majority did not address this argument, 
rather stating that preemption would be found even if such a duty 
existed.128 The majority addressed the question of preemption under 
the assumption that the federal law did in fact require the 
manufacturers to ask the FDA to initiate a label change.129 
The Court found preemption based on its view that it was 
impossible for the generic manufacturers to comply with both the 
federal and state laws.130 The Court dismissed the FDA’s suggested 
avenue of change whereby a generic manufacturer would ask for 
help, finding that state law “demanded a safer label” and was not 
concerned about the “possibility of a safer label.”131 Thus, whether 
such action might have worked was, in the Court’s opinion, 
irrelevant.132 Ultimately, the Court determined that the question of 
impossibility is determined by “whether the private party could 
independently do under federal law what state law requires of it.”133 
The Court went on to define this independent standard: “[W]hen a 
party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s 
special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise 
of judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot independently 
satisfy those state duties for pre-emption purposes.”134 
A lesser standard, according to the Court, would essentially 
eliminate any preemption except for express preemption.135 Further, 
the Court found support for its decision through its belief that the 
phrase of the Supremacy Clause “any [state law] to the Contrary 
notwithstanding,” is a non obstante provision.136 This provision, 
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according to the Court, “indicates that a court need look no further 
than ‘the ordinary meanin[g]’ of federal law, and should not distort 
federal law to accommodate conflicting state law.”137  
The Court briefly touched on Wyeth and its view of why the two 
rulings are not contrary to one another.138 Specifically, the Court 
pointed out that the CBE regulation139 gave Wyeth, the brand-name 
drug manufacturer in that case, the ability “‘to unilaterally 
strengthen its warning’ without prior FDA approval.”140 The Court 
admitted, however, that the FDA retained the power to rescind any 
unilateral change that Wyeth should make.141 Nevertheless, the 
Court read Wyeth as only “ask[ing] what the drug manufacturer 
could independently do under federal law, and in the absence of 
clear evidence that Wyeth could not have accomplished what state 
law required of it, found no pre-emption [and held that] ‘the 
possibility of impossibility’ was ‘not enough.’”142 The Court then 
distinguished PLIVA from Wyeth by stating that “here, ‘existing’ 
federal law directly conflicts with state law.”143 According to the 
Court, the question in PLIVA was not one of a possibility of 
impossibility as it had been in Wyeth but rather “whether the 
possibility of possibility defeats pre-emption.”144 
Lastly, the PLIVA Court admitted that “finding pre-emption here 
but not in Wyeth makes little sense.”145 However, the Court 
attempted to shed responsibility for its reasoning simply because it 
is not the Court’s duty to determine if laws are “‘unusual or even 
bizarre.’”146 
B. Lack of Compatibility with Wyeth v. Levine 
The PLIVA decision is troubling due to its apparent discrepancy 
with Wyeth, which was decided just two years prior. Even the 
                                                                                                             
 137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Kennedy did not join in this part, and as such, 
there were only four justices who endorsed it. This statement directly conflicts 
with the presumption against preemption. Id. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 2581 (majority opinion). 
 139. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2006). 
 140. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 
(2009)) (citation omitted). 
 141. Id. at 2581 n.8. 
 142. Id. (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. (citation omitted). 
 144. Id. (citation omitted). 
 145. Id. at 2581. 
 146. Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 
2710, 2733 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 




majority in PLIVA pointed out this inconsistency.147 Although it 
attempted to reconcile the two decisions, an in-depth analysis of 
Wyeth shows why they are incompatible.  
1. Wyeth v. Levine 
In Wyeth, the suit, like in PLIVA, was based on a failure to 
warn.148 However, the defendant in Wyeth was a brand name, not a 
generic drug manufacturer.149 In its defense, the brand-name drug 
manufacturer in Wyeth argued that preemption existed in both the 
physical impossibility sense, as well as the “purposes and 
objectives” sense.150 
The Court began its preemption analysis by noting two aspects of 
preemption that have been set out by federal jurisprudence.151 First, in 
every preemption case, Congress’ intent is the most important 
factor.152 Second, there is a presumption against preemption, 
especially in those fields that states have traditionally occupied.153 In 
order to rise to the level of preemption, Congress’ intent for federal 
law to supersede state law must be clear and manifest.154 The Court 
then touched upon the FDCA’s history, giving examples of various 
times throughout its history in which Congress made sure not to 
invalidate state law.155 In its rejection of Wyeth’s arguments that the 
manufacturer was not allowed to update its labeling, the Court noted 
that a drug manufacturer “bears responsibility for the content of its 
label at all times,” and with the CBE regulation, the manufacturer 
could provide an updated warning before receiving FDA approval.156 
The FDA could have rejected the labeling changes, but without “clear 
evidence” that the FDA would have rejected such a change, the Court 
could not have come to the conclusion that impossibility preemption 
applied.157 In closing, the Court emphasized the FDA’s traditional 
belief that state law served as a “complementary form of drug 
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regulation,”158 thus providing further support for why a finding 
against preemption was logical. 
2. PLIVA’s Lack of Conformity with Wyeth 
The PLIVA and Wyeth decisions are not compatible. Although 
complete focus on the CBE regulation would suggest a legitimate 
reason for the distinction between these two cases, such a narrow 
approach is not proper. The Court in PLIVA addressed generic, not 
brand name, manufacturers’ ability to change their warning labels. 
Thus, the rules and regulations applicable in PLIVA were slightly 
different from Wyeth. It is true, as the PLIVA Court pointed out, that 
the CBE regulation did not grant the generic manufacturers the 
ability to unilaterally change their labels.159 Nevertheless, the 
variation in the regulations should not have led to different results 
because the generic manufacturers in PLIVA still retained the ability 
to institute change.160 
The dissent in PLIVA characterized the majority’s decision as 
one which disturbs the landscape of impossibility preemption.161 
According to the dissent, the “possibility of impossibility” had 
never, until this decision, been enough to warrant preemption.162 
However, the majority countered such an assertion, characterizing 
PLIVA as a question, not of “possibility of impossibility” but rather 
one of “possibility of possibility.”163 Although they appear distinct, 
there is no meaningful difference in the two standards.  
According to the majority, the possibility of impossibility 
standard applied in Wyeth because the labels could be changed by 
manufacturers unilaterally, even though the FDA could later 
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disapprove and rescind the changes.164 Yet, this is essentially what 
occurred in PLIVA. In PLIVA, the majority acknowledged that had 
the generic manufacturers reached out to the FDA, they might have 
eventually complied with both federal and state law labeling 
requirements.165  
To summarize: In Wyeth, brand-name manufacturers could make 
changes, but those changes could later be rescinded. In PLIVA, 
generic manufacturers could make changes only after FDA approval. 
The majority determined that such a distinction was enough for 
different rulings.166 However, such reasoning is illogical. In both 
instances, ultimate compliance was dependent on the FDA. Finding 
preemption in one situation but not the other, merely based on the 
timing of the FDA’s participation in the label change, is unsound.  
If the brand-name manufacturers in Wyeth had unilaterally 
changed their label, only to have that revision rescinded, they no 
longer would have been in compliance with state law. Similarly, if the 
generic manufacturers in PLIVA had requested a label change but 
were denied, then they would have never complied with state law. 
Different conclusions should not be reached regarding impossibility 
preemption simply because a brand-name manufacturer has the ability 
to comply with state laws temporarily while the a generic 
manufacturer lacks such an ability. Ultimate compliance is dependent 
on the FDA. A slight timing difference should not dictate a different 
result regarding preemption. 
There would also be no substantial difference in compliance with 
state and federal law if each manufacturer’s requested or implemented 
change would have been approved (as in the case of the generic) or 
not revoked (as in the case of the brand name). Again, the only 
difference would be a slight one and only with regard to timing. For 
example, if the brand-name manufacturer in Wyeth had instituted a 
change under the CBE process and had not had that change later 
revoked when the FDA reviewed that change, it would have complied 
with both state and federal laws from the moment the change was 
instituted. If the generic manufacturer in PLIVA had submitted a 
proposed change to the FDA and had that change approved, then the 
manufacturer would have fulfilled its federal duties throughout the 
entire process and its state duties from the moment it was able to 
implement the approved change. In these two examples, ultimate 
compliance with state law again depends on the FDA. The only 
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difference between the generic and the brand-name manufacturer in 
such situations is that the brand name will have been in compliance 
with its state duty for a longer period of time. However, a slight 
distinction in time, simply because the generic must wait a bit longer 
to institute a certain change does not merit a difference in 
preemption determinations.  
As shown by these two examples, the only logical finding of 
preemption would occur in the first example in which the generic or 
brand-name drug manufacturer had attempted to comply with both 
state and federal duties, only to find that the FDA prevented it from 
doing so. As such, the only real difference between the two avenues 
available for change, because they applied to brand-name and generic 
manufacturers, was that in the case where the FDA ultimately agrees 
with the need for a change, the generic manufacturer’s compliance 
with state law would be at a slight delay. Such a delay does not merit 
a different conclusion regarding preemption.  
As evidenced by the previous examples, the FDA plays a strong 
role in ultimately determining whether a labeling change is 
admitted. Thus, the PLIVA majority’s focus on the brand-name 
manufacturer “unilaterally” being able to strengthen its label is 
simply misplaced. Just as the generic manufacturers in PLIVA might 
have been unable to comply, so might have the brand-name 
manufacturers in Wyeth. While the majority sought to distinguish 
between a “possibility of possibility” and a “possibility of 
impossibility,”167 no such distinction was justified. A brand-name 
manufacturer may later have its update rescinded, as could have 
been the case in Wyeth; such a situation could be interpreted as a 
possibility that compliance with state law may eventually be 
impossible or as a possibility that compliance may be possible. The 
two only differ depending on the phrasing of the question raised.  
A central premise of federal labeling requirements is the belief 
that manufacturers are responsible for their label’s content at all 
times.168 Ultimately, this is even more reason to support the clear 
evidence standard endorsed by the Wyeth dissent, whereby a 
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manufacturer does not escape liability (because preemption is not 
found) without first showing such clear evidence that it would not 
have been able to comply with both federal and state law.169 
The PLIVA dissent correctly highlighted many of the problems 
regarding the PLIVA majority’s preemption analysis. In particular, 
the dissent noted aspects of impossibility preemption that were 
ignored in its analysis.170 Additionally, the majority invents a new 
preemption rule, stating that the impossibility question is determined 
by whether “the private party could independently do under federal 
law what state law requires of it.”171  
In support of this independent standard, the majority cites 
Wyeth, where preemption was not found, in which the defendant 
could have unilaterally done what was necessary to comply with 
both state and federal law.172 Clearly, the majority misinterpreted 
the meaning of unilaterally in the Wyeth decision. Yes, the 
manufacturer in Wyeth was able to make changes by following the 
CBE process, and yes, the manufacturer could update its label 
without first seeking FDA permission. However, as the Wyeth 
majority recognized, the ultimate decision of whether the updated 
label could remain was in the hands of the FDA.173 Dependence on 
the FDA concerning a later judgment is not independence. The 
PLIVA majority took the notion of unilaterally making a change 
dependent on subsequent approval and extended it to unilaterally 
making a completely independent change. Further, as the dissent 
pointed out, Wyeth provided no evidence that unilateral action is a 
necessary requirement to defeating preemption, just that it is 
sufficient.174 
Like the manufacturer’s ability in Wyeth to initiate change, the 
manufacturer in PLIVA could also have initiated the required change 
simply by petitioning the FDA. And like Wyeth, without subsequent 
FDA approval or assistance, there would have been no ultimate 
compliance with state law. However, the PLIVA decision did not 
account for whether the generic manufacturers had even attempted to 
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initiate a change.175 Therefore, the ruling of impossibility preemption 
was improperly reached. The Court should have instituted the clear 
evidence standard that was required in Wyeth, especially in light of 
the burden of proving impossibility falling on the defendant.176 This is 
the proper approach because courts must hold defendants claiming 
impossibility preemption to a “demanding” standard.177 The dissent 
advocated the correct approach when it stated that “defendants will 
usually be unable to sustain their burden of showing impossibility if 
they have not even attempted to employ that mechanism” made 
available by the Federal Government, which would allow for 
complying with state law, even in those instances in which “that 
mechanism requires federal agency action.”178 
III. EFFECTS OF FINDING IMPOSSIBILITY  
The Court’s decision in PLIVA not only affects the doctrine of 
impossibility preemption but will also have a strong impact on 
consumers and brand-name drug manufacturers. Regarding 
preemption, PLIVA significantly broadens what is deemed 
impossible, thus extending preemption’s reach. Additionally, as noted 
in the PLIVA dissent, the presumption against preemption, especially 
regarding state laws concerning health and safety, is seemingly 
forgotten.179  
A. Impact on Preemption 
An unfortunate consequence of the new impossibility standard 
established in PLIVA is that much state law that is complementary to 
federal law will be undermined. Not requiring defendants to show 
that they made an attempt to comply with both state and federal law 
will make self-regulation no longer a priority for the manufacturers, 
thus removing a much-needed complement to FDA regulation.180 
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Without fear of state failure-to-warn claims, manufacturers of 
generic drugs will no longer possess the necessary incentive to 
initiate updating their warning labels. As previously mentioned, the 
FDA possesses limited resources181 and will therefore lose much-
needed assistance. Thus, the PLIVA preemption decision directly 
conflicts with the FDA’s long-established goal of consumer 
protection.182 The effects will be especially problematic in those 
instances in which the generic drug manufacturer is the sole vendor 
of a drug in the market. In these instances, without a brand-name 
manufacturer to turn to, either consumers will be left without a 
failure-to-warn remedy altogether, or a brand-name manufacturer 
will unfittingly be faced with extended liability. 
B. Consumers Without a Remedy or Drug Manufacturers with 
Newfound Liability? 
The most important aspect of PLIVA is the effect that it will 
have on similar scenarios in the future. Unless the Supreme Court 
decides to overrule PLIVA in the near future, which is unlikely, then 
there are really only two possibilities of what may result in future 
instances when a consumer is injured due to a generic drug’s failure 
to warn. Either these consumers will be left without a remedy, or 
brand-name manufacturers will become liable for generic drug 
manufacturer’s failure to warn. Neither result is just. 
If consumers are left without a remedy, then the entire purpose 
behind drug warning labels is defeated.183 Although consumers 
could still bring other types of suits against generic manufacturers, 
those types of suits are not as straightforward or as easy to prove as 
those regarding a failure to warn.184 Alleging design defect, 
contaminated drug, or manufacturing glitch subjects consumers to 
“murkier and more perilous waters.”185  
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The consequence of not being able to bring failure-to-warn suits 
against generic manufacturers is that injured parties may turn to the 
brand-name manufacturer. This result would be highly unjust. 
Brand-name drug manufacturers already bear the huge initial costs 
of drug approval and should not be forced to worry about liability 
for all labeling defects, regardless of whether they are in a position 
to know that a change is necessary.186 As previously mentioned, 
generics dominate the market in overall presence.187 It is not fair to 
hold brand-name manufacturers liable for an entire market in which 
they have only a small share and, consequently, a minor share of the 
profits.188 Further, once generic versions of a drug become available, 
brand-name manufacturers often exit the market.189 In these 
instances, regardless of how the question of liability plays out, 
injured consumers will essentially be left without an adequate 
remedy. 
Furthermore, greater liability for brand-name manufacturers will 
burden the entire market for drugs. Already faced with incredibly 
high entry costs, brand-name drug manufacturers’ fear of indefinite 
liability would strike at their primary incentive for serving as drug 
innovators—profit.190 This in turn could lead to less innovation for 
brand-name drug manufacturers and, as a result, a more stagnant 
evolution of medicine. Ultimately, consumers would be hurt most 
by such a result.  
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C. FDA Losing Necessary Assistance? 
Perhaps the most serious cries for change should come from the 
FDA. As the Wyeth Court noted, “[T]he FDA [has] traditionally 
regarded state law as a complementary form of drug regulation. The 
FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the 
market, and manufacturers have superior access to information 
about the drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks 
emerge.”191 With PLIVA, the safety of consumers is further 
compromised. 
IV. FIXING THE CURRENT SITUATION 
To fix this problematic labeling state of affairs, Congress should 
amend the FDA laws, which would be the most logical thing to do. 
Congress can either extend the CBE regulations to generics, or it 
could create a separate and distinct, yet similar option for generic 
manufacturers.192  
A. Extending the CBE Process to Generics 
As previously discussed, origins of the CBE process can be 
traced to when the Commissioner of Food and Drugs “concluded 
that in the interest of drug safety certain kinds of changes in the 
labeling and manufacturing of new drugs . . . should be placed into 
effect at the earliest possible time.”193 Thus, the CBE process was 
born out of the notion that certain changes were extremely important 
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and should be instituted as soon as possible. In extending the CBE 
process to generics, the FDA would reinforce the purpose behind the 
CBE process. With generics often in control of a certain market, and 
brand-name drug manufacturers exiting the market after generic 
versions of their drugs are approved, logically the CBE process 
should extend to generics.  
The FDA argues that the CBE process does not extend to 
generics because allowing such an option would disrupt the 
sameness requirement between the generic drug and its brand-name 
counterpart.194 Such a problem is easily fixed. If the CBE process 
were to extend to generics, then the “sameness” duty that is imposed 
on generics would need to extend to brand-name drugs. That way, 
whenever a generic drug manufacturer initiates a change under the 
CBE process, then the brand-name manufacturer would need to do 
the same. A discrepancy might occur only if the two manufacturers 
were attempting to make a change at the same time. However, as 
noted in PLIVA, situations in which generic manufacturers uncover 
new information requiring a label change are very rare.195 
Nonetheless, that does not excuse the FDA from creating an avenue 
available to generic manufacturers. A consumer should not suffer 
injury simply because situations like this do not occur very often. If 
the FDA is correct that these situations are not at all common, then 
the extension of the CBE process to generic drug manufacturers 
should not disrupt the rules and regulations as they exist. 
Further, if uncovering new information for a label update occurs 
once a generic drug is on the market, the manufacturer that is more 
likely to uncover such information is the one with the greater market 
share, whether it is the generic manufacturer or the brand-name 
manufacturer.196 This is logical because that manufacturer would be 
exposed to more information that may evidence the need to change 
the labeling.197 Such a system would incentivize generic drug 
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manufacturers to ensure their products’ safety, thus ensuring the 
safety of consumers and therefore fulfilling the purpose of the CBE 
process. 
B. The CBE As Merely a Starting Point? 
The CBE process could also be extended to only those 
manufacturers whose generic drugs have a certain percentage of the 
market or have been on the market for a certain period of time. 
Although such a determination may be difficult, the benefits are 
twofold. First, generics would not be prematurely liable for such 
inadequacies. Second, brand-name manufacturers who have 
benefited from exclusivity of the market for years and may have 
profited handsomely will retain the incentive to update their warning 
labels until their generic counterparts are in a position to do so. A 
potential conflict might arise if a generic manufacturer were to 
discover grounds for new warning labels quickly after entering the 
market because the generic manufacturer would not yet possess a 
requisite market amount and thus would be unable to initiate the 
change. However, such an occurrence is unlikely. Because failure-
to-warn claims arise when manufacturers are aware or should be 
aware of a danger, and such new information is rarely discovered,198 
it is unlikely that such an occurrence would exist prior to the generic 
at least being in the market for a substantial period of time and also 
having a substantial market share.  
If the FDA prefers to initiate a separate process for generics, one 
based on the CBE process, then that may work as well. One option 
would be a process that requires the generic manufacturer to submit 
its findings not only to the FDA but also to the brand-name 
manufacturer once it initiates a change. That way, should the brand-
name manufacturer object for any reason, it will be able to share its 
thoughts with the generic manufacturer as well as the FDA. In 
allowing the brand-name manufacturer to do so, it would be 
unnecessary to amend the sameness requirement so that labels do 
not have to be copied until the ultimate FDA approval is received 
for such a change. Critics may argue that this would enable the 
labeling of generic drugs to be different from brand-name drugs, 
                                                                                                             
 
better chance of uncovering such information requiring a label change. These 
situations do not affect the CBE extension proposal because it would merely 
extend that ability to generic drugs, thus leaving untouched the liability, and 
therefore incentive, for brand-name manufacturers to continuously monitor and 
update their labeling. 
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thus defeating the purpose of the sameness requirement. However, 
this process could be relatively short; if the FDA did not agree with 
such a change, then the period of time in which there is a 
discrepancy between the two labels would be brief.  
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate responsibility for labeling resides with 
manufacturers, as it should. Manufacturers are the most 
knowledgeable parties when it comes to their own products. It is only 
logical that they should be allowed to have some control over their 
labeling. The Court’s unfortunate ruling in PLIVA that federal law 
preempts state failure-to-warn claims regarding generic drugs 
presents several problems. Of these, the biggest problem will 
ultimately be felt by the consumers, who will most likely be left 
without a meaningful remedy. If the burden shifts to brand-name 
manufacturers, consumers will still be at a loss because they will be 
poorly protected, as generic manufacturers will no longer be 
incentivized to maintain safe and adequate warning labels. This is 
especially disheartening considering that the FDA’s ultimate purpose 
in drug regulation is to protect consumers.199  
However, not all hope is lost. The FDA could either extend the 
CBE process to generic manufacturers or create a separate avenue 
for generic manufacturers that is based on the CBE process. With 
anywhere from one-third to one-half of generics no longer having a 
brand-name counterpart marketed200 and with the prevalence of 
generics continuing to increase, the time to act is now. 
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